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SOUTHERN AFRICA

U.S. Pushes White Compromise

Prime Minister Ian Smith's announcement December 11 that his white-minority regime had reached a cease-fire agreement with the African liberation movements in Rhodesia highlights the dramatic shift in the political direction of Southern Africa that has accompanied the disintegration of Portuguese colonial rule in the region.


Smith told a nation-wide television and radio audience that the end of guerrilla war in Rhodesia would lead to a constitutional conference with representatives of the African majority population. In exchange for the cease-fire, Smith said he would release an estimated 400 African political prisoners. South African Premier John Vorster welcomed Smith's announcement and declared the same day that if the cease-fire is confirmed he will pull South African troops out of Rhodesia. The Smith regime has relied heavily on South African military aid and soldiers in its counterinsurgency operations against African guerrilla forces.

Smith's announcement of a cease-fire, however, may be premature. Bishop Abel Muzorewa, the head of the moderate African National Council, returned to Salisbury December 12 from the Southern Africa summit conference in Lusaka, Zambia and confirmed that the rival liberation groups in Rhodesia had agreed to merge with the ANC for the upcoming constitutional negotiations with the Smith regime, but Muzorewa said that "freedom fighters will be instructed to suspend fighting" only when a date for the talks has been set.

On December 8, the ANC, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), and a small splinter group, FROLIZI, signed a unity agreement in Lusaka, declaring that they would negotiate as a united front with the Smith regime in "any conference for the transfer of power to the majority." All of the organizations have demanded African majority rule in Rhodesia, where 5.7 million blacks outnumber the white settler population by more than 20 to one. But the ANC is the only legal black political party in Rhodesia, and it has always followed a nonviolent, reformist strategy in trying to win black rights and political power. ZANU and ZAPU, on the other hand, have pursued armed struggle as the principal means to majority rule. In the past, both guerrilla organizations have strongly criticized Bishop Muzorewa and the ANC for undercutting the liberation movement by holding talks with Smith and compromising African nationalist demands.

But in Lusaka, Muzorewa welcomed the "freedom fighters" into his organization and, for the first time, expressed support for armed struggle. The African bishop read the declaration of unity, which concluded: "The leaders recognize the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe."

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KISSINGER SURPRISED BY CRITICISM

New SALT Accord Fails to Put Cap on Arms Race

Secretary of State Kissinger expressed "surprise" and "mounting amazement" last week at the bitter debate developing over the tentative agreement on strategic arms limitations (SALT) reached by President Ford and Soviet party leader Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok late last month. At that time, Kissinger argued that the accord had "put the cap on the arms race." Later Kissinger told reporters, "When the figures are correctly analyzed, you will see that the ten-year ceiling on multiple warheads represents a very significant achievement."

Responding to increasing congressional and press criticism of the accord, Kissinger said Dec. 7 that a failure by Congress to approve the Vladivostok agreement could spur a new arms race and pose "extremely serious" consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations. If the SALT accord faces the same kind of debate that has held up trade benefits to the Russians, Kissinger said, "the Soviet Union would be able to conclude only that political detente with us faces domestic difficulties of an insuperable nature."

The accord met immediate criticism from the press. The *Christian Science Monitor* warned that the agreement "does not restrain the arms buildup but permits it to go forward." The *Wall Street Journal* said that "it's difficult to believe" that nuclear forces in 1985 "will be much smaller than they would have been without the agreement." And the *New York Times* said that the Vladivostok agreement "legitimizes a further buildup, quantitative and qualitative, by both sides." "If this is 'putting a

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Africa

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"The new ANC," the *Los Angeles Times* correspondent in Lusaka commented, "will be more warlike than the old." But for now, at least, the new ANC has conditionally agreed to a cease-fire.

Muzorewa, flanked by ZANU's Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo, told supporters in Rhodesia that the merged nationalist movement will continue to seek independence on the basis of majority rule. Earlier, the new ANC had dropped the demand for immediate majority rule as a precondition for constitutional talks with the Smith regime.

The proposed talks and cease-fire and the Lusaka conference that united the long-divided liberation movements are the result of intensive behind-the-scenes diplomacy, carried out mainly by Zambia's Pres. Kenneth Kaunda and South Africa's Vorster, under pressure from the United States.

Diplomatic contacts and negotiations between the white-minority regimes and black Africa were set in motion by the dramatic change in the balance of power in southern Africa after the April 25 military coup in Portugal.

Next July, FRELIMO—the leftist guerrilla movement—will be in full control of an independent Mozambique, and Rhodesia will be surrounded by hostile black states, except for a 152-mile border with South Africa. Fearing that the tide is turning against them, South African leaders have sought accommodation with black Africa. To appease Zambia and other black nations, the apartheid regime has leaned on the more isolated and vulnerable white-minority government in Rhodesia to reach some kind of stable compromise settlement with the African majority population.

Vorster has put increasing pressure on Smith to negotiate with African nationalists and head off what South Africa fears most: a takeover in Rhodesia by ZANU or ZAPU, the guerrilla insurgents.

Vorster, in turn, has been pressured by the U.S. to come to grips with the new realities in southern Africa after the Portuguese coup. Under the guidance of Henry Kissinger, the United States has moved closer to South Africa since 1969. The U.S. wants to protect its more than \$1 billion investment in South Africa and safeguard the sea routes out of the oil-rich Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean and around South Africa's Cape of Good Hope to Western Europe and the U.S.

Britain's announcement Dec. 3 that it

is ending its agreement to use the newly expanded Simonstown naval base in South Africa has given new impetus for more open Washington-Pretoria military ties: Vorster wants a replacement for the British and the U.S. wants a base bordering on the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. has defended South Africa in the United Nations this fall and increased its military contacts with the South African armed forces. But the State Department is convinced that the Vorster regime must make certain key concessions to black Africa in order to avoid a major war in southern Africa and guarantee stability for U.S. investments and strategic interests in the region.

The *Washington Post* reported last month that Asst. Sec. of State for African Affairs Donald Easum was in South Africa to press the government to "abandon its military support for white-ruled Rhodesia, get out of Namibia [Southwest Africa] . . . and make substantial changes in its policy of apartheid." In return, the *Post* said, Vorster could expect "acceptance in black Africa" and could receive increased, perhaps even open, U.S. backing.

Vorster is at least willing to give the new strategy a try, particularly since the U.S. apparently is not pushing him to end white-minority economic and political domination within South Africa itself.

On Oct. 23, in a major policy speech, Vorster declared that South Africa and its black neighbors had to choose "between peace on the one hand or an escalation of strife on the other." While preparing for war with a record \$900 million military budget for 1974-75, Vorster also offered "the way of peace" and "the normalizing of relations" to black Africa.

Two days later, Pres. Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia praised Vorster's speech as the "voice of reason for which Africa and the rest of the world have been waiting" and said that he was willing to negotiate "if the South African government is ready to follow the way of peace." Zambia has gone on to play a key role in the negotia-

tions over Rhodesia, exerting strong influence on ZANU and ZAPU—both based in Zambia—to end their guerrilla war and reach agreement with the white-minority regime, provided that Ian Smith makes genuine political concessions to the African majority population.

Meanwhile, South Africa was taking a beating in the UN, where Vorster's "peace" signals were having little impact. Only a rare triple veto by the U.S., Britain and France saved South Africa from being expelled from the UN by the Security Council for systematic and flagrant violations of the UN charter and the declaration of human rights. Vorster thanked the Western powers for their reprieve and promised, "If South Africa is given a chance, they [black African states] will be surprised at where the country will stand in six to twelve months." Nevertheless, the General Assembly voted 91 to 22 with 19 abstentions Nov. 12 to bar South Africa's delegation from the current session.

One test of Vorster's willingness to adapt to a changing southern Africa will be whether he actually withdraws the 8,000 troops stationed in Rhodesia. If Vorster does withdraw from Rhodesia, the new line of defense for South Africa will become the hopelessly weak and dependent "black-ruled" bantustans ("homelands")—a buffer zone of economic and political hostages.

Without South African backing, Smith knows he cannot survive. His regime has been under the constant pressure of an increasingly successful guerrilla campaign by ZANU launched in northeastern Rhodesia in Dec. 1972. Recently ZANU has attacked within 30 miles of the capital.

South Africa is in a much better position to withstand the forces of African independence, especially as it firms up its alliance with the U.S.

The Ford administration has avoided open support for South Africa because of domestic and international opposition to the apartheid regime. The U.S. welcomed South Africa's role in the proposed cease-fire and talks in Rhodesia—apparently the first result of U.S. efforts to get South Africa to modify its policies (in this case its support for Rhodesia) in return for U.S. support. Many observers believe that Vorster's pressure on Rhodesia may be tied to talks currently under way between the Pentagon and the South African Defense Ministry.

But conciliatory gestures by Vorster have not been enough to satisfy critics of Washington's "tilt toward apartheid" or South Africa's 18 million black majority population, which continues to suffer the brutal oppression of apartheid.



South African Premier John Vorster

INDOCHINA

Still America's Wars

Nearly two years have passed since the signing of the Paris peace agreement (Jan. 1973) and the conclusion of the Laos peace accord (Feb. 1973). Since then, the



U.S. has withdrawn its combat troops and ended its massive bombing campaign in Indochina. But Washington

has continued to give crucial backing to repressive right-wing regimes in South Vietnam and Cambodia—primarily through large doses of U.S. military and economic aid.

By most accounts, that aid has enabled Lon Nol in Cambodia and Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam to remain in power and continue the war despite a near total lack of popular support. All of that may soon change, however. Congress is clearly weary of the Indochina aid drain, and it is likely that aid totals for Southeast Asia will continue to drop dramatically in the coming years. That fact is casting a dark shadow over the future of the U.S.-backed regimes in Saigon and Phnom Penh.

• **SOUTH VIETNAM:** In the past year Thieu has faced what some observers describe as the worst crisis of his career. That crisis erupted in September with public campaigns against corruption and

demonstrations against Thieu. Some groups have openly called for his resignation. Thieu's critics now include not only the traditional Third Force groups, but also conservative Catholics who formerly backed his regime.

The PRG now regards Thieu as *the* obstacle to implementation of the political provisions of the Paris peace agreement. On Oct. 8, they called for his overthrow, saying they would talk to a new administration in Saigon which might include rightists, so long as it was committed to carrying out the unfulfilled parts of the Paris accord.

So far, the Ford administration has demonstrated a commitment to maintaining a pro-U.S. regime in Saigon (although the PRG predicts that Washington may try to replace Thieu, "changing horses" if the situation in South Vietnam becomes too hot). Ford is fighting to restore congressional aid cuts and is expected to request an additional \$300 million in supplemental aid to Saigon at the beginning of next year. U.S. efforts to secure multilateral aid for Saigon through the World Bank are also continuing.

• **CAMBODIA:** In Cambodia, where there is no peace agreement, fighting continues unabated. The war has just entered its fifth dry season—the time when the rebel forces of Prince Norodom Sihanouk's National United Front tradi-

tionally take the offensive. Recently, Sihanouk predicted that if necessary, his forces would continue to fight for "five, 12 or 20 years."

The only notable victory recorded by the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime this year was the defeat Nov. 28 of a bid to give Cambodia's UN seat to Sihanouk. The NUF continues to rule out negotiations with Lon Nol or participation in a coalition government. They say this would only legitimize the illegal rule of the Phnom Penh administration, which came to power in a coup against Sihanouk.

"The United Nations vote," said the *New York Times* Nov. 29, "changed nothing in the situation" in Cambodia, and "morale remains as low as it has ever been." With a casualty rate of 300 per day, the Lon Nol regime has been unable to make any real gains on the battlefield in the last year. Riddled by corruption, the government seems to have simply abandoned the economy, with its inflation rate of 300 percent a year.



Like Thieu, Lon Nol also faces stiff cuts in U.S. aid. Last year's assistance totaled \$700 million—this year the Senate wants to cut it to \$347 million.

• **LAOS:** In Laos, a coalition government formed in April after nine years of war has made substantial progress toward implementing the Laos peace agreement signed in February 1973. The new government, made up of the Pathet Lao and the U.S.-backed Vientiane right wing, survived its first big test when Prince Souvanna Phouma—often described as the only political figure who holds the trust of both sides—went to France for ten weeks to recuperate from a heart attack. Many feared that the right would take the opportunity to sabotage the coalition as it did in 1957 and 1962. But the government proceeded with its business—including an exchange of prisoners—and there was no right-wing coup attempt.

Several sensitive issues, including the future of the National Assembly, were left in abeyance until Souvanna's return. The Assembly, a holdover from the pre-coalition government days, was dissolved under strong pressure from the Pathet Lao, but the right is seeking to maintain it as a last stronghold of their political power.

Prince Souphanouvong, leader of the Pathet Lao, told the *Far Eastern Economic Review* in November that he hopes the new government will succeed where earlier coalitions failed. This time, he said, the international situation is more favorable, with detente between the U.S. and China and the Soviet Union. Also, the Pathet Lao has demonstrated its ability to resist a brutal U.S. war, and Pathet Lao troops are part of a mixed police and armed force that guards the key cities of Vientiane and Luang Prabang.

Souphanouvong indicated concern, however, over the future U.S. role in Southeast Asia—a question which may be crucial to the survival of the unique Lao-tian coalition government. "Why should the Americans transfer their military headquarters from Saigon to Nakhorn Phanom [Thailand] just on our border?" he said. "Why did they not remove it to Clark Airbase or to Okinawa . . . ? The best course would be if they returned to the U.S. All this leads us to wonder about American intentions. We must be very vigilant."



Saigon opposition leaders: Deputy Ho Ngoc Nghan, Sen. Vu Van Mau, "Big" Minh

press censorship. But the underlying elements have been in the making for some time: staggering inflation and a hopeless downward spiral in the economy, severe repression, and the fact that Thieu has offered people in Saigon-held areas little more than belt-tightening and endless war. In addition, Thieu faces a seemingly irreversible decline in the U.S. aid that makes up some 85% of his annual budget.

Congress has already cut military aid to Saigon from a requested \$1.45 billion to \$700 million. And the new foreign aid bill approved by the Senate Dec. 4 set a ceiling of \$1.27 billion for all kinds of aid to Saigon. That bill is now in the House.

The PRG is watching the political situation in the cities where for the first time since the peace agreement was signed, opposition forces have mounted large dem-

onstrations against Thieu. Some groups have openly called for his resignation. Thieu's critics now include not only the traditional Third Force groups, but also conservative Catholics who formerly backed his regime.

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Last spring, Henry Kissinger was praised as "the most remarkable Secretary of State in American history," dubbed the "Supersecretary," and called

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the "President for Foreign Affairs." "Through a combination of circumstances: success, candor, deviousness, brilliance, and sheer motion," Leslie Gelb of the *New York Times* wrote in April, "Henry A. Kissinger has transformed most of Washington into a cheering section for his foreign policies."

But by the end of the year, Kissinger began to face increasing criticism in the U.S. press for his diplomatic methods. Richard Holbrooke writing in the *Washington Post* last September, called the Secretary "obsessively secretive," "wholly free of any constraint based on a set of moral beliefs," and "capable of almost any deal in a negotiation." Anthony Lewis of the *New York Times* recently wrote, "The Kissinger method is to operate alone, without the restraints normally imposed on officials by principle, institutions or even law."

Kissinger has also faced unexpected criticism in the last few months for his policies—particularly from the Congress that cheered him previously. He has been attacked for first giving tacit support to the Cyprus coup sponsored by the Greek military junta, and then supporting the brutal Turkish invasion of Cyprus, including stepping up military aid to Turkey in violation of congressional prohibitions. The Secretary has been criticized for doing almost nothing to save the faltering NATO alliance, with having failed to bring peace to Vietnam, and with moving too slowly in normalizing relations with China.

The dramatic revelations that Kissinger masterminded the "de-stabilization" of the Allende government in Chile led to a loud but quickly muted outburst from Congress. Kissinger has been attacked from all sides for his failure to move the Middle East crisis toward a resolution and his miscalculation on Arab recognition of the PLO.

Even his most recent "breakthrough," the Vladivostok agreement on strategic arms limitation (SALT II), has received surprisingly strong criticism in Congress.

Kissinger did find support even among critics for his warnings about the peril to the West of the high price of oil and for his threats against the petroleum producing nations in demanding lower prices. But so far, this has worked against him, as his words have not been matched by ad-

Kissinger's Global Strategy

ministration action.

Most of Kissinger's critics have also cautioned, however, that attacks on the Secretary should not go too far. Columnist Joseph Alsop recently warned of the "suicide impulse" in the mounting attack on Kissinger.

Kissinger's congressional and press protection from "excessive" criticism in part reflects anxiety over the collapse of the Nixon administration and uncertainty about the new Ford administration, especially in a period of Western economic and political disarray.

But there is another reason for the circumspect attacks on the Supersecretary: for the most part, Kissinger's critics do not object to his foreign policy strategy, and the few who do disagree seem at a loss to offer an alternative. Even Kissinger's leading congressional critic, Senator Henry Jackson, has often appeared to be more of a nagging presidential hopeful than a serious critic.

Consequently, there has been little public discussion of Kissinger's global strategy and its implications.

The goal of Kissinger's strategic thinking, and of his diplomacy since 1969, has been the creation of a stable world order which preserves the pre-eminence of U.S. power and interests gained following World War II. The task was especially difficult following the 1968 Tet Offensive in Vietnam which dramatically demonstrated the limits of U.S. power, and the economic and monetary crises of that period which showed a serious decline in the strength of the dollar. Washington also faced growing demands for independence from U.S. economic and political dominance not only in the Third World, but also in Western Europe and Japan.

Kissinger recognized that the strategy which led to Vietnam had to be changed. "Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam," he wrote in the summer of

1968, "it is clear that it has greatly diminished American willingness to become involved in this form of warfare elsewhere."

In the age of "no more Vietnams," Kissinger has implemented a complex strategy of force and negotiations based on detente with the Soviet Union and China to try to prevent a further decline in U.S. power. Kissinger has sought to bring the Soviet Union and China into a U.S.-dominated world structure. In what is often lauded as a "non-ideological" approach, Kissinger acknowledges that both countries have legitimate interests in different areas of the world and in their relations with the U.S. This acknowledgment, however, calls for similar understandings and cooperation in return.

In practice, the focus of detente has been the other nuclear superpower, the Soviet Union. Detente has been built on "linkage," which Kissinger defined in June 1972 as a "broadly based accommodation of interests with the U.S.S.R." In explaining the first strategic arms limitation agreement (SALT I) that had just been negotiated in Moscow, Kissinger said it was "linked organically to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age." Any attempt to violate the accord, Kissinger said, would jeopardize a "broad political relationship."

Kissinger has also made it clear that the Soviet Union is to be held responsible for crises throughout the world: "If relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots," Kissinger warned in Fall 1973, the Soviet Union would imperil "its entire relationship with the U.S."

On the other hand, cooperation with the U.S. on international issues, Kissinger indicated, would lead to greater U.S. cooperation and compromise on bilateral issues including SALT, trade, and credits.

Kissinger saw Vietnam as the first test case: linkage could help the U.S. achieve a favorable settlement of the war, while the U.S. could "link" Soviet help on Vietnam to progress on other issues of mutual concern. Immediately after taking power in 1969, Nixon and Kissinger deliberately slowed the pace of negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at beginning formal SALT talks (which had been agreed upon by the Johnson administration) in order to pressure Moscow on Vietnam, according to the pro-Kissinger inside study of SALT I, *Cold Dawn*, by John Newhouse.

From 1969 to 1972, Kissinger at-



Moscow: Kissinger and Brezhnev

Confrontation, Subversion

tempted to arrange a big power settlement of the war through the Soviet Union, and to some extent through China. The Vietnamese, however, demanded that the war be settled in bilateral negotiations with them—a demand the Soviet Union and China ultimately supported, sending Kissinger back to Paris to negotiate an accord with North Vietnam that he likely could have gotten in 1969.

While Kissinger has negotiated major agreements on SALT, trade and other bilateral issues with the Soviet Union, he has concluded no major agreements with China since the historic and dramatic opening of relations with Peking in 1971. Nevertheless, the U.S. relationship with China has been a vital part of his global strategy. As far back as 1964, Kissinger argued that the Sino-Soviet split was severe if not irreconcilable. And in 1968, he wrote that "We should be in a position to exploit opportunities by keeping open options towards both countries." Since coming to Washington, Kissinger has sought to deepen the Sino-Soviet rift and to use it to pressure each side into greater compromise with the U.S.

Negotiations with the Soviet Union and China are only one side of Kissinger's detente strategy. "Diplomacy which is not related to a plausible employment of force," Kissinger has written, "is sterile." Consequently, if negotiations and linkage fail to resolve an international crisis because of Soviet unwillingness to cooperate or even inability to pressure an ally (such as North Vietnam), Kissinger believes the U.S. must be prepared for a military response. The Soviet Union and the U.S. reached the brink of military confrontation over Jordan in 1970. Kissinger again threatened a military confrontation during the October War in 1973 when he ordered a world-wide alert of U.S. forces, allegedly in response to a much-disputed report of Soviet preparations for Mideast military intervention.

Under Kissinger, such military confrontations take on a potential nuclear significance. Kissinger made his reputation as a defense intellectual for advocating a military strategy that includes limited nuclear warfare.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Kissinger argued that the threat of all-out nuclear war is not credible because it would be suicidal. A more realistic deterrent, Kissinger said, would be the threat of limited nuclear warfare if conventional war failed to achieve U.S. goals. While some critics argued that it is unlikely a nuclear war

could remain limited, Kissinger replied that negotiations (such as the SALT talks) should give an "indication of our intentions to the other side" so that the U.S. adversary would not miscalculate and escalate the conflict to mutual nuclear annihilation.

While Kissinger has not reaffirmed this strategic thinking since he came to Washington, it seems to have remained central to his diplomacy of force and negotiations. The option of limited nuclear war appears even more crucial to Kissinger's strategy in the period since Vietnam when military intervention with strictly conventional forces is a less credible threat.

While Kissinger's strategy calls for conventional and limited nuclear force to back up negotiations with the Soviet Union over international crises, he recognizes that the U.S. cannot preserve the status quo everywhere in the world by threatening massive military intervention. In fact, "the capacity to destroy," Kissinger wrote in 1968, "is difficult to translate into a plausible threat even against countries with no capacity for retaliation." Subversion, Kissinger argues, becomes an increasingly important form of power in the nuclear age. In a surprisingly frank statement, Kissinger wrote in 1968 that "States with a high capacity for exploiting domestic instability [e.g., the U.S.] can use it as a tool of foreign policy," while "weak states may be more concerned with a country's capacity to organize domestic unrest in their country than with its capacity for physical destruction."

Chile became Kissinger's test case for use of subversion as an alternative to military intervention. Kissinger coordinated the U.S. economic and covert political warfare campaign against Salvador Allende as head of the supersecret and supra-governmental 40 Committee. Kissinger reportedly told the 40 Committee June 27, 1970, "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." He oversaw CIA expenditures of \$11 million first to prevent Allende's election, then to "de-stabilize" his democratically elected government.

Kissinger's 40 Committee reportedly now has on its agenda CIA operations in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, where the U.S. fears leftist gains in unstable political and economic climates. Kissinger defended continued covert CIA operations in a meeting with congressional leaders in September to discuss the Chile



Peking: Kissinger and Chiao Kuan-Hua

revelations. "Despite criticisms of the CIA," he reportedly said, "if Italy went communist, there would be criticism that the U.S. had not done enough to save her."

Kissinger has sought to preserve the status quo either through increased support of repressive dictatorships or through subversion of democratic change that threatens U.S. economic, political or military interests and thus threatens to "de-stabilize" the Pax Americana of international order and stability. While previous administrations have engaged in covert political warfare and supported military dictatorships, Kissinger has elevated the strategic importance of these policies in a period of increasing international economic and political instability and decreasing U.S. ability to intervene militarily. Kissinger's strategy, however, appears only to have preserved the status quo in the short run, since U.S. client regimes are increasingly hard pressed by internal demands for social justice and independence from the U.S.

Kissinger's attempt to solve international crises through linkage has failed to lead to lasting solutions as in the current Middle East impasse. His strategy also leaves the shadow of a potential nuclear showdown hanging over every international crisis spot.

While Kissinger may enjoy the mystique of his "obsessive secrecy," it seems that his global strategy demands covert operations, from the secret bombings of Cambodia to the subversion of the Allende government. Kissinger apparently does not believe these activities—and probably unknown scores of others like them—could be carried out if they were widely debated within the administration or carefully scrutinized by the public.

internewsroundupinternewsroundup

AMERICAN WOMAN ARRESTED, TORTURED

A young American woman, who has been held by Argentine police for four weeks without charges, told a U.S. embassy official Dec. 6 that she has been tortured. Twenty-five-year-old Olga Talamante, who was teaching English in Argentina, was arrested during a raid on a house in Azul, about 150 miles south of Buenos Aires. Police say that guns and literature belonging to the Montoneros, a left-wing Peronist guerrilla group, were found in the house.

Talamante was held for more than three weeks before being contacted by the U.S. embassy in Argentina. The U.S. consular official who saw her reported that she said she had been mistreated and subjected to electric shocks and beatings. She is still being held, and the Argentine government says it plans to put her on trial.



Olga Talamante

State Department involvement in the case followed a campaign in Talamante's home state of California to publicize her arrest and pressure the government to insure her safety. Talamante's parents, who until recently were farmworkers, live in Gilroy, California, and she is a graduate of the University of California at Santa Cruz. Talamante's friends say that to their knowledge she was not personally involved in any of the left-wing opposition groups in Argentina, but that she may well know people who are. They say she had a plane reservation to return to the U.S. on Nov. 24, just two weeks after her arrest.

Since Nov. 6, Argentina has been under a state of siege which allows the police and military to use extraordinary measures in their effort to eliminate left-wing guerrilla opposition to the regime of Pres. Isabel Peron.

SABOTAGE, BOMBINGS MARK 40-DAY STRIKE

Water utility workers in Puerto Rico voted Dec. 9 to accept a compromise wage hike, ending a militant, 40-day strike. However, the president of the 3,000-member independent union, Hector Rene Lugo, said he would continue to fight for a better deal than the \$210/month pay increase to be spread over the next three years. Workers at the government-owned Aqueducts and Sewers Authority currently earn an average monthly salary of \$450.

The long, hard-fought strike—marked by sabotage, bombings and the mobilization of the National Guard—reflects the bleak economic situation on the U.S.-controlled island. Officially, unemployment has hit 14.5%, but opposition politicians put the figure as high as 30%. And a 47% rise in prices over the last two years has devoured recent wage increases.

Gov. Rafael Hernandez Colon activated some 2,000 members of the National Guard after sabotage of the island's water system last month left the capital of San Juan with little or no water for two days and bombs damaged several U.S.-owned businesses, including ITT, Grand Union, Burger King and Union Carbide. Gov. Hernandez blamed the attacks on "terrorists," adding that he suspects members of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party—a pro-independence group.

Juan Mari Bras, head of the PSP, denied the charge, but explained the bombings "as the response of students, labor and the liberation movement in general to the repressive, colonialist government."

UN COMMAND TO STAY

The United Nations Command is likely to remain in South Korea for at least another year, following the defeat Dec. 9 of a resolution sponsored by Algeria, China and the Soviet Union to dissolve the Command and end foreign troop involvement in South Korea. Instead, the UN voted 61-42 in favor of a U.S.-backed resolution which calls on North and South Korea to resume talks on reunification and refers the question of the future of the UN Command to the Security Council. In reality the UN Command is run by the Pentagon, and the only foreign forces serving under it are 38,000 U.S. troops.

Pres. Park Chung Hee's critics took advantage of the attention focused on South Korea during the UN debate to press their demands for a democratic constitution. The current constitution gives Park unlimited powers, including the power to remain president for life. Fifty-nine opposition lawmakers held a 72-hour sit-in in Korea's main National Assembly hall to dramatize their demands for a new constitution and the release of nearly 200 political prisoners arrested in the last year. The sit-in was not disrupted—Park's hand was limited by the fact that the sensitive Korea question was at that moment before the UN. Kim Young Sam, leader of the opposition New Democratic Party, pledged further efforts to attain their goals.

CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The UN General Assembly voted 120 to 6 with 10 abstentions on Dec. 12 to adopt a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States proposed by Mexico. Voting against the Charter were the U.S. and five Western European countries.

The Charter recognizes the sovereignty of each country over its natural resources and encourages the formation of producers' organizations like OPEC to develop the national economies of poor countries. It also acknowledges the right of each state to nationalize or expropriate foreign holdings, paying the companies adequate compensation. Disputes over compensation are to be settled according to the laws of the country which expropriated the holdings.

The Charter says that states have the right, individually or collectively, to eliminate colonialism and all forms of aggression, occupation and foreign domination. It ends by proclaiming that no state has the right to use economic or political measures to force another nation to surrender the exercise of its sovereign rights.


Mexico's foreign minister Emilio Rabasa thanked "all those countries, weak and powerful" who had "joined forces to create a new, genuine era of world solidarity." He criticized nations that voted against the Charter, saying that they were pursuing the selfish interests of only one sector, the economically privileged. Rabasa closed by saying that the new Charter constitutes the difference between waste and the wise use of world resources, between inequity and justice, and in the end, between war and peace.

"TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY"?

Third World countries in the United Nations have reacted sharply to U.S. Ambassador John Scali's speech Dec. 6 to the General Assembly attacking what he called the new "tyranny of the majority" in the world organization. Referring to UN support for the Palestine Liberation Organization and the recent vote to bar South Africa from the current session of the

Assembly, Scali condemned "the growing tendency of the organization to adopt one-sided, unrealistic resolutions." He warned Third World nations that their "paper victories" in the UN had left the American people "deeply disturbed," and he threatened to curtail U.S. financial and political support for the organization.

Israel praised Scali's speech, which also won support from some Western powers, but many Arab, African, Asian and Latin



Scali at UN

American delegates said it was "unfair," "brutal," and "regrettable." Kuwait's representative commented that the U.S. was bitter because Third World countries were challenging the supremacy of the U.S.-European bloc—"the group that used to roam the building like serene falcons in an uninhabited forest." An Asian delegate told the *Los Angeles Times* Dec. 7 that Scali's criticism was excessive: "The U.S.," he said, "has never lost on a genuine American issue here, unless Israel is considered the 51st state. Wait for the vote on Korea—Washington will win again."

Although there is no question that U.S. dominance of the UN has been eroded by the growing solidarity of the Third World, the U.S. did in fact win on the Korea vote as well as the Nov. 27 vote on Cambodia, which favored the U.S.-backed Lon Nol regime.

SUPPORT FOR PLO FROM LEFT AND RIGHT

In the wake of Yasser Arafat's UN appearance last month the Palestine Liberation Organization seems to be consolidating its political base in the Palestinian population. The Amman newspaper *Al Sabab* reported Dec. 7 that the Marxist guerrilla group led by Dr. George Habash, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, is ready to rejoin the executive committee of the PLO—which it quit on Sept. 26 to protest alleged contacts between the PLO and the U.S. State Department (categorically denied by both parties). On the more moderate side, two prominent West Bank politicians who had previously served in administrations under King Hussein proclaimed their support for the PLO. Anwar Khatib, Hussein's governor of Jerusalem until the Israeli occupation in 1967, endorsed the PLO in an article in the newspaper *Al Quds* Nov. 28. The following day the former speaker of the Jordanian parliament Hekmat Masri, a wealthy olive merchant

of Nablus, told AFP that he would even be willing to accept the presidency or co-presidency of a Palestinian political authority originating from the PLO—a possibility long speculated in the Beirut press.

PLO sources in Damascus meanwhile indicated that they would not oppose the resumption of the Geneva peace talks without PLO participation. But Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin told a Jerusalem audience Dec. 3 that resumption of the Geneva conference "under present circumstances would not mean peace but an attempt by the superpowers and the Arabs to impose a settlement."

The same day, 15 Israeli members of parliament announced that they are trying to form a group to block the rumored formation of a government of national unity embracing the far-right opposition. The National Religious Party—now included in the cabinet—has called for such a coalition—which would oppose any territorial concessions on the West Bank in negotiations with the Arabs.

SAUDI ARABIA TO TAKE 100 PERCENT OF ARAMCO

Two-day old talks between Saudi Arabia and four U.S. corporations over the nationalization of the giant Aramco oil company were unexpectedly suspended Dec. 10 in London. Last summer, Saudi Arabia told the U.S. shareholders—Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, and Standard of California—that it planned to take 100 percent ownership of the company. The



Aramco oil terminal

London talks were intended to negotiate details of the takeover, including compensation for the U.S. companies' assets estimated at \$2 billion, and the price and quantity of the oil which the companies will be able to buy from Aramco in the future. According to an Exxon company spokesman, the talks ran into "difficulties" on these questions and are not expected to be resumed until January at the earliest.

Aramco is the world's biggest and most profitable oil company. Last year, Aramco reportedly made more than \$3.2 billion profit on \$8.7 billion in sales.

The consequences of the Aramco nationalization will be far-reaching. The *New York Times* predicted Dec. 7 that the "take-over would likely initiate the complete nationalization of Western-owned [oil] companies by other producing governments."

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MICRONESIA: Micronesian representatives broke off talks with U.S. officials on the future status of the Trust Territory because of disagreements over the return of public lands to the Micronesians. (AP 12/11) ● **BRITAIN:** Labour peer Lord Brockway told the House of Lords that British Centurion tanks have been exported to Jordan as "earth-moving tractors," and called for stricter control over firms which are selling arms to Rhodesia and South Africa through Jordan. (Agence France Presse 12/9) ● **PORTUGAL:** Sen. Edward Kennedy has called for a \$50 million loan fund to be divided equally between Portugal and Portuguese African territories now gaining independence. (*Christian Science Monitor* 12/4) ● **CHILE:** The junta announced the 23rd devaluation of the Chilean currency this year. (AP 12/10) ● **COLOMBIA:** Establishment of diplomatic relations between Colombia and China appear imminent, according to reports from Peking. (Prensa Latina 12/12) ● **URUGUAY:** The outlawed National Confederation of Workers has called for a 24-hour strike on Dec. 18 to demand increased salaries and freedom for political prisoners. (AFP 12/9) ● **OMAN:** More than 3,000 Iranian soldiers are said to have joined Omani government forces in a major offensive against the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman in the province of Dhofar. (AFP 12/10) ● **MOZAMBIQUE:** The huge

Cabora Bassa dam will be nationalized in the next year, according to Joaquin Chissano, FRELIMO leader and Prime Minister of the transition government. (PL 12/2) ● **VIETNAM:** The Saigon daily *Trang Den* reported that officials from the U.S. embassy and AID mission in Saigon are aiding Saigon tax collectors in all parts of the country. (Vietnam News Agency 12/9) The PRG charged that the U.S. aircraft carrier *Enterprise* is cruising off the coast of South Vietnam and that aircraft from the carrier are flying reconnaissance missions over PRG territory. (VNA 12/11) ● **DIEGO GARCIA:** The House, following the Senate, voted \$18.1 million for expansion of U.S. military facilities on Diego Garcia, providing the president certifies the construction is essential to the national interest. (AP 12/12) ● **MILITARY:** As one of his final acts as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. J. W. Fulbright is trying to obtain Senate approval of the 1925 Geneva protocol banning chemical and bacteriological warfare, a task made difficult by administration unwillingness to include tear gas and herbicides under the treaty. (*New York Times* 12/11) ● **WORLD ECONOMY:** Representatives at the Common Market summit meeting in Paris found it "alarmingly easy to agree" on the danger of a worldwide depression. (*Wall Street Journal* 12/10)

SALT

[continued from page 1]

cap on the arms race,''' the *Times* said, "then a shrimp can whistle, as a former Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev was fond of saying."

The Vladivostok agreement has also met with congressional opposition, led by Senator Henry Jackson. The presidential hopeful has called on Congress to reject the agreement, even before it is finalized with the Soviet Union. Jackson argued on CBS's "Face the Nation" Dec. 8 that the U.S. should have sought lower force totals and demanded that the Ford administration "secure substantial mutual phased reductions."

There have been two major areas of objection to the terms of the agreement:

1. Critics charge that the ceilings are too high. Each side is allowed 2,400 missiles and bombers, which can be any combination of land-based missiles, sea-based submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers. Of these, 1,320 can have multiple warheads, or MIRVs. The number of warheads, or nuclear bombs, on each MIRVed missile is not limited by the accord. Critics argue that these totals legitimize the arms buildup already underway by both sides rather than working for a reduction of strategic arms, and that they could lead to the addition of more than 10,000 nuclear warheads by each side in the next decade. (The U.S. has deployed MIRVs on 838 missiles, with previous plans for a total of 1,286 MIRVed missiles. The Soviet Union is expected to deploy its first MIRVs early next year.)

2. Critics also attack the failure of the accord to limit the qualitative aspects of the arms race. They say the agreement will not halt the search for more accurate and invulnerable weapons systems, and will thus cost taxpayers tens of billions of dollars.

These charges were given unexpected verification by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger at a news conference on Dec. 6. The *New York Times* speculated Dec. 7 that the administration scheduled the press meeting "to emphasize that Mr. Schlesinger, who has been generally depicted as a skeptical hardliner on arms negotiations with the Russians, supported the Vladivostok agreement." Although Schlesinger called the agreement a "major step forward," he broke ranks with Kissinger and Ford, acknowledging that the accord would lead to "some upward adjustment" in the strategic arms budget.

This contradicted remarks made by Ford following his return from Vladivostok, in which he suggested that the SALT agreement would not lead to increased arms spending.

Schlesinger said that the accord would cost more because it would require larger strategic forces than had been previously planned. Schlesinger made it clear that in the interest of strategic "stability" he would have preferred lower ceilings on weapons deployments.

The defense secretary also said that he foresees the need for restructuring U.S. strategic forces as a result of the Vladivostok agreement. Schlesinger argued that the U.S. would have to rely more on submarine-based missiles and on strategic bombers in the future, because of the potential increased vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles under the terms of the accord.

This "restructuring" of U.S. strategic forces, Schlesinger said, would involve ap-

proval if not increases in military spending for new weapons systems. To increase U.S. sea-based missiles, Schlesinger said, the Pentagon might need to build two Trident submarines in addition to the ten already planned. At current prices, each Trident will cost more than \$1 billion.

Schlesinger also called for a new strategic bomber—although he did not specifically commit himself to the B-1 which is nearing the flight-test stage. Current plans call for 240 B-1's at a cost of about \$18 billion.

Schlesinger responded to critics such as Jackson who have argued that the Vladivostok agreement will give the Soviet Union an advantage in total number of warheads because the Russians have larger missiles which can carry more warheads. He told reporters that the U.S. will proceed with development of a larger U.S. missile, the "MX," to counter the Soviet advantage. Under the terms of the Vladivostok accord, the U.S. could spend billions of dollars replacing its land-based Minutemen missiles with the larger MX missiles.

Schlesinger also indicated that the U.S. will continue development of air-mobile and land-mobile missiles—missiles that can be launched from planes or moved from place to place on land. Such missiles are not prohibited by the accord and have the strategic advantage of being relatively difficult to destroy in a first-strike nuclear attack. The Pentagon test-fired its first air-mobile missiles dropped from a C-5a in October.

Some critics argue that an alternative to the Vladivostok agreement—and the arms race it appears to legitimize if not accelerate—would be an agreement restricting modernization programs by banning the testing and deployment of new weapons, combined with an agreement on phased reductions of weapons already built and ready for use.

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